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CLIMATE CHANGE AND CRISES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
POSSIBILITIES FOR GEOGRAPHIC REENVISIONING 
Hari M. Osofsky* 
Climate change poses a crisis for international law because ad-
dressing it requires many levels of government, types of law, and govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors.1 Moreover, this governance complexi-
ty involves scientific, technical, and legal uncertainty; simultaneously over-
lapping and fragmented legal regimes; difficulties of balancing inclusion 
and efficiency; and inequality and resulting injustice.2 A myriad of strate-
gies must be employed to address both mitigation and adaptation to impacts 
fairly and effectively. This thought piece explores how the combination of 
failures by nation-states to address this problem effectively and of efforts by 
a wider range of actors not generally counted in international lawmaking 
suggest a possible way forward for international law in responding to com-
plexity.  
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 1 I have explored these issues in depth in Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and 
Climate Change: Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. Rev. 237 (2011) 
[hereinafter Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism]; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “Interna-
tional”?: Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009) [Osofsky, Is 
Climate Change "International"?].  
 2 I have analyzed each of these aspects of governance complexity in more depth in the 
context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. See Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Gov-
ernance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011). 
File: Osofsky 2 Created on:  2/10/2012 5:23:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:31:00 PM 
424 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:423 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME IN CRISIS 
As a formal matter, international legal efforts to address climate 
change fit within a traditional model of international lawmaking. The domi-
nant multilateral climate change regime consists of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)3 and agreements 
negotiated under that convention. The UNFCCC provides general commit-
ments and a structure for achieving more specific targets and timetables.4 
Parties to the UNFCCC meet regularly in conferences under its auspices, 
most recently in Durban in 2011, to attempt to negotiate additional agree-
ments.  The 2011 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Durban resulted in an 
agreement to reach a universal agreement by 2015 and established an “Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” to begin 
negotiating this towards this 2015 goal.5  In addition, thirty-five of the par-
ties to the Kyoto Protocol, the only agreement negotiated under the 
UNFCCC which provides binding targets and timetables, committed to a 
second commitment period, which will begin in January 2013, when the 
first one ends.6   
However, the international legal regime and this narrative of it are 
in crisis for two primary reasons. First, and least problematically for a tradi-
tional account, the existing regime and negotiations are struggling to 
achieve their goals.7 Many nation-states are having difficulties meeting their 
Kyoto Protocol commitments, and those commitments do not go as far as 
scientific consensus suggests is needed to prevent the most severe risks of 
climate change.8 Moreover, the United States, Canada, Japan, and Russia 
  
 3 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], available at http:// 
untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/unfccc_eng.pdf. 
 4 Id. 
 5  See Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, Draft Decision-/CP.17 (advance unedited version), available at http://unfccc.int/files/ 
meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2011).   
 6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; Outcome of the Work of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
16th Sess., 6, Draft Decision-/CMP.7 (advance unedited version), available at http://unfccc. 
int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period].  
 7 I have explored these failures in my prior scholarship. See, e.g., Osofsky, Is Climate 
Change "International"?, supra note 1.  
 8 For analyses of Kyoto Protocol compliance, including issues facing particular countries, 
see LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO 
WORK (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005); RUSSIA AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Anna Korppoo et al. eds., 2006); Alastair R. Lucas, My-
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were not among the thirty-five countries committing to this second period, 
the United States never committed to the first one, and the potential 2015 
universal agreement will not result in the reductions needed now.9 
These difficulties do not necessarily suggest the need for innovative 
theorizing about international law creation. A Westphalian10 narrative of 
international law creation, in which international law arises from the con-
sent of sovereign and equal nation-states, would likely acknowledge the 
regime as creating limited international legal obligations and assess it as not 
entirely successful in achieving its goals.11 However, the substantive prob-
lem of addressing climate change effectively through international law 
would remain. A core question that this thought piece asks is whether cur-
rent international legal efforts should focus primarily on achieving better 
agreements in negotiations among nation-state parties, or whether more 
inclusive conceptions of international law creation which shift that focus 
somewhat might actually serve as a tool in solving this problem. 
Second and more fundamentally, there is a great deal of activity 
with legal significance on climate change outside of the UNFCCC structure. 
Some of this activity includes a wide range of additional formal internation-
al legal agreements among nation-states, which, for completeness, should be 
included in even a traditional account of international law creation.12 For 
example, the Montreal Protocol’s13 efforts to address ozone impact green-
  
thology, Fantasy and Federalism: Canadian Climate Change Policy and Law, 20 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 41, 52–56 (2007); Mindy G. Nigoff, The Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism: Does the Current Structure Facilitate Kyoto Protocol Compliance?, 18 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 249 (2006). For an analysis of the ways in which the Copenhagen 
Accord commitments are insufficient to bring the reductions that scientists say are needed, 
see Kelly Levin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges 21 
(World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2010), available at http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/ 
comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_pledges_2010-02-01.pdf. 
 9 For commitments under the second period, see Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment 
Period, supra note 6.  For an analysis of the gap in addressing emissions as of the 2011 Dur-
ban COP, see U.N. Environment Programme, Bridging the Emissions Gap: A UNEP Synthe-
sis Report (Nov. 2011), http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_bridging_gap.pdf. 
 10 By “Westphalian,” I mean guided by the core notions of nation states as primary sub-
jects and objects of international law and of international law being created through the con-
sent of sovereign and equal nation-states. For expositions of Westphalian understandings of 
international law, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287–88 
(6th ed. 2003); Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sover-
eignty Waiver”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great 
Powers, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 383 (2005). 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 I have discussed some of this activity in Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 1. 
 13 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 
I.L.M. 1550. 
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house gas emissions significantly.14 In addition, and less acknowledged in 
most of the commentary on the UNFCCC, nations have crafted many bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements (with fewer parties) on relevant issues such 
as alternative/renewable energy.15 These agreements arguably should also 
be included in almost any account of the creation of international law rele-
vant to climate change.  
The conceptual conundrum comes not from these additional formal 
agreements among nation-states—though they contribute to the simultane-
ous overlap and fragmentation of international law—but rather from the 
many other less formally binding agreements among nation-states and 
among a wider range of governmental and nongovernmental entities. The 
agreements reached among cities, states, and provinces during the Copen-
hagen COP in December 2009 exemplify this difficulty particularly well 
because they include subnational governments from nation-states which 
were having difficulty reaching agreement and the pledges within them rep-
resented massive quantities of emissions reductions.16 More than fifty 
mayors from a wide range of nation-states, as well as some governors, 
signed Copenhagen Climate Communiqué, which summarizes the signifi-
cant steps taken at a local level on climate change and calls for nation-state 
action.17 In addition, local government leaders from fifty-nine countries 
registered 3,232 targets in the Copenhagen City Climate Catalogue, a trans-
national effort to compile local targets and achievements.18 At a somewhat 
  
 14 For an analysis of the relationship between the Montreal Protocol and climate change 
and a proposal for the future, see Mark W. Roberts & Peter M. Grabiel, A Window of Oppor-
tunity: Combating Climate Change by Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate the 
Production and Consumption of HFCs and ODS Banks, 22 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 99 
(2009). 
 15 See, e.g., Press Release, White House, U.S.-Mexico Announce Bilateral Framework on 
Clean Energy and Climate Change (April 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/the_press_office/US-Mexico-Announce-Bilateral-Framework-on-Clean-Energy-and-Clim 
ate-Change; International Council on Clean Transportation, Athens Resolution (2010), 
http://www.transport2012.org/bridging/ressources/files/1/1138,ICCT-Athens-Resolution. 
PDF; Press Release, White House, U.S.-China Energy Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-clean-energy-announceme 
nts. 
 16 I have previously analyzed these agreements and the dilemmas that they pose for inter-
national lawmaking in Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: 
Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 64 (2010).  
 17 The Copenhagen Climate Summit for Mayors, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 14–17, 2009, 
Cities Act: Copenhagen Climate Communiqué (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Communiqué], 
available at http://www.kk.dk/Nyheder/2009/December/~/media/B5A397DC695C4099834 
62723E31C995E.ashx. 
 18 The City Climate Catalogue, The City Climate Catalogue: The Copenhagen City Cli-
mate Catalogue of City Commitments to Combat Climate Change, List of Commitments, 
http://www.climate-catalogue.org/index.php?id=6870 (last visited Jan 3, 2012). 
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larger scale, leaders from states and provinces within Algeria, Canada, 
France, Nigeria, and the United States held a joint press conference to an-
nounce the planned launch of a Club of 20 Regions (R20) in September 
2010, an arrangement which builds upon the October 2009 Governors’ Cli-
mate Summit and the Global Climate Solutions Declaration signed there.19 
At more recent COPs, this trend continued, with local leaders signing the 
2010 Mexico City Pact20 and the Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Gov-
ernment.21 Localities also have taken action through the World Mayors 
Council on Climate Change22 and the carbonn Cities Climate Registry.23 
These agreements have no formal international legal significance 
under traditional notions of international law. They are formed among sub-
national actors who, as a matter of international law, are not subjects and 
objects of international law and could rescind their commitments at any 
time. The commitments themselves involve subnational, not international, 
legal action. Moreover, under the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, they would not serve as sources of international law. They are not trea-
ties, and are unlikely to be treated as evidence of nation-states’ customary 
international law obligations or of the general legal principles that they rec-
ognize.24  
However, these subnational networks’ activities have great potential 
significance for UNFCCC nation-state parties achieving the goals laid out in 
that convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Durban agreements. For exam-
ple, the Communiqué notes that signatory cities together include more than 
half of the world’s population and that up to seventy-five percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions originate from urban areas.25 Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s press release announcing the formation of the R20 in-
cludes estimates by the United Nations Development Program that the sub-
national level will provide up to eighty percent of the pollution reduction 
  
 19 OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CAL., GAAS:753:09, Gov. Schwarzenegger Announces 
New Coalition of Subnational Leaders to Combat Climate Change Press Release (Dec. 14, 
2009), http://gov38.ca.gov/press-release/%2014032/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
R20 Press Release]. 
 20 Signatories, THE MEXICO CITY PACT, http://www.mexicocitypact.org/en/the-mexico-
city-pact-2/list-of-cities/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 21 Durban Adaptation Charter for Local Governments, adopted  Dec. 4, 2011, http://www. 
iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/initiatives/LG_roadmap___COP_17_files
/Durban_Adaptation_Charter_5Dec.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).   
 22 Members’ List, WORLD MAYORS COUNCIL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.world 
mayorscouncil.org/members/members-list.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 23 Reporting Cities, CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://citiesclimateregistry.org/ 
cities/reporting-cities/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 24 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
 25 Communiqué, supra note 17. 
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policies needed meet a new international commitment.26  These statements 
take place in the context of broader transnational efforts among mayors; as 
of February 2010, 877 European cities had signed the Covenant of Mayors, 
with targets that surpass the European Union’s 2020 goals,27 and 1,017 U.S. 
mayors have committed to meeting or exceeding Kyoto Protocol targets and 
timetables.28 
As with the first problem of insufficient formal international law, 
this second issue could be understood through a traditional, Westphalian 
approach to the creation of international law. These subnational agreements 
do not need formal international legal significance to help supplement the 
international legal efforts by nation-states under the UNFCCC. The subna-
tional efforts can be treated as part of the nation-state meeting its commit-
ments. However, such an understanding captures the transnational aspects 
of the subnational activities in a rather limited fashion; the transnational 
agreements are legally insignificant, and the coalitions only matter to inter-
national law-making to the extent that they influence nation-states’ behavior 
in the UNFCCC meetings or help them to meet their commitments.29   
II. WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS IN ADDRESSING THIS CRISIS 
One’s geographic understanding of the nation-state foundationally 
shapes how one understands the crisis described above. Treating the nation-
state as an enclosed space, as stricter Westphalian accounts tend to, means 
viewing it as a singular entity with clearly delineated boundaries and view-
ing its internal workings as generally irrelevant to its international law 
commitments. Such a view of the nation-state is generally intertwined with 
a strong belief in the notion of sovereign equality. International law recog-
nizes that, with very limited exceptions, states are sovereign over the space 
within in them, which is treated as domestic and only relevant to interna-
tional law as part of the national entity. States can protect themselves 
against intrusions upon that enclosed space and generally can choose when 
to enter into consensual agreements with other states to abide by treaties and 
establish customary international law norms.30 As described in Part I, under 
such an account, the limitations of the UNFCCC process and other climate 
change agreements among nation-states are an unfortunate example of in-
ternational law not yet fully addressing the problem. The non-nation-state 
  
 26 R20 Press Release, supra note 19. 
 27 Covenant of Mayors, COVENANT OF MAYORS, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.eumayors.eu/ 
IMG/pdf/covenantofmayors_text_en.pdf. 
 28 Mayors Leading the Way on Climate Protection, THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF 
MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/revised/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
 29 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 30 Id. 
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agreements only have potential international legal relevance if they influ-
ence the behavior of states.31  
But what if that portrayal of nation-state geography is inaccurate 
and incomplete? A number of scholars in different fields have grappled with 
this question. For the purposes of this Part, I focus on two such accounts, 
each of which challenges this narrative in different ways.32 Judith Resnik, a 
legal scholar, has argued that international legal norms move across sover-
eign borders continuously and become part of internal, domestic under-
standings whether or not they are formally accepted. She claims that battles 
over the use of international law in domestic courts, for example, miss the 
fact that international norms enter domestic decisions whether or not the 
international law is formally accepted as part of them.33 Julie Cidell, a geog-
rapher, has focused on the role of the individual in the creation of scale. Her 
work demonstrates that our delineation into scalar levels—international, 
national, state, local, community, individual—should take into account that 
the individual is not simply the smallest level, but a part of every level.34 
Bringing together these two insights provides the basis for what I 
have termed a permeable model of the nation-state. The basic account of 
what formally constitutes international law creation does not change, but the 
view of the nation-state within it does. The nation-state becomes a less 
monolithic entity, as international legal norms flow in and out of its borders 
and individuals (and other entities) within it shape its course.35 This change 
in viewpoint has significant implications for the narrative of international 
law creation generally and in the context of climate change in particular. 
The formal moment of international law creation becomes less central as 
one describes the myriad of interactions and norm evolution that precedes it 
and influences its implementation. 
Once one recognizes the nation-state as permeable, however, fur-
ther questions arise about the traditional model of international law creation. 
Namely, if the nation-state is constituted by individuals and entities and has 
borders that can be informally permeated, does the formal story also need to 
be changed? Should a view of the nation-state as fully enmeshed with and 
constituted by a wide range of actors and entities in multiple arenas change 
  
 31 See supra Part I. 
 32 My previous work on the nation-state spaces has explored these accounts. See Hari M. 
Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and Criminal Law, 
53 VILL. L. REV. 117 (2008) [hereinafter Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes]; 
Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change and Environmental Justice: Reflections on Litigation over 
Oil Extraction and Rights Violations in Nigeria, 1 J. HUM. RTS. & THE ENV’T 189 (2010). 
 33 Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Fed-
eralism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1627–33 (2006). 
 34 Julie Cidell, The Place of Individuals in the Politics of Scale 38 AREA 196, 202 (2006). 
 35 See Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes, supra note 32. 
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the way in which international law is created? In response to questions such 
as these, scholarship on global legal pluralism,36 which has an intellectual 
debt to the New Haven School,37 and on new governance38 (among other 
potentially relevant literatures) begins to rethink the formal story.39 This 
scholarship decenters the nation-state and allows for a broader conception 
of what might constitute law. It provides the basis for a narrative of interna-
tional law creation in which the UNFCCC negotiations might be ap-
proached more inclusively and in which agreements by subnational gov-
ernments might be integrated more with treaties among nation-states.  
Together, these theories open the door for nontraditional answers, 
which might be more effective, to the dilemmas proposed in Part I. Regard-
ing the inadequacy of the UNFCCC processes in achieving reductions at the 
rate scientists say are needed, gaining more nation-state support for more 
serious mitigation and adaptation plans may not simply be a matter of better 
proposed agreements and COP negotiating strategies. Rather, a more inclu-
sive UNFCCC process might put more pressure on the nation-states and on 
other actors, like subnational governments, which control a lot of emissions. 
If subnational governments were included more directly in negotiations, 
they might convince nation-states of the possibility of achieving greater 
reductions and commitments by nation-states based explicitly on subnation-
al commitments would make those cities, states, and provinces more legally 
  
 36 For an analysis of how the legal pluralism literature can assist an understanding of the 
global legal environment of global legal problems, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1169–79 (2007). 
 37 The New Haven School views law as “a process of authoritative decision by which the 
members of a community clarify and secure their common interests.”  1 HAROLD D. 
LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, 
SCIENCE AND POLICY xxi (1992). 
 38 For an analysis of the applicability of new governance to international lawmaking, see 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009) (adapting new gov-
ernance theory to the international legal context). 
 39 The enmeshed model of the nation-state was first developed in Osofsky, The Geography 
of Justice Wormholes, supra note 32. Other strands of international legal theory, such as 
regulatory institutions theory, also grapple with the mix of formal and informal law and 
actors. For examples of scholarship from the Regulatory Institutions Network on responsive 
regulation at Australia National University, see generally Valerie Braithwaite, Ten Things 
You Need to Know About Regulation and Never Wanted to Ask, in REGULATORY INSTS. 
NETWORK 2006 (RegNet Occasional Paper No. 8, 2006), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/ 
publications/10thingswhole.pdf; Charlotte Wood et al., Applications of Responsive Regulato-
ry Theory in Australia and Overseas, in REGULATORY INSTS. NETWORK 2010 (RegNet Occa-
sional Paper No. 15, 2010), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/Occasional Pa-
per_15.pdf. Integrating the wide range of potentially relevant theories is beyond the scope of 
this brief essay, but it explores the possibilities for creating a more comprehensive theory by 
integrating additional strands. For a more in depth analysis, see Osofsky, supra note 2. 
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accountable.40  The 2011 Durban negotiations represented a step in that di-
rection, with more language on subnational governments included in the 
international agreements, but these smaller governments were still limited to 
participating through their nation-states delegations or through joining coa-
litions with observer status.41 
III. CONCLUSION  
Crafting more inclusive structures would face many obstacles. 
Since the UNFCCC negotiations take place under a treaty signed by nation-
states, those nation-states would have to agree to establish such a process 
for it to become a formal part of the negotiations.42 If the nation-states do 
not do so, such a process could at most be a complementary side process, 
which might not have enough weight to accomplish the kind of integrated 
dialogue and agreements described above. In the scenario in which such a 
structure is informal, careful structuring would be needed to give it more 
direct impact on the UNFCCC negotiations than the current side forums and 
observer status do.43 
Practical considerations would also be daunting. Who should decide 
who is included and excluded, and how should those decisions be made?44 
In those decisions around inclusion, how can representation be simultane-
ously manageable and comprehensive and avoid both democratic deficit 
problems and accompanying difficulties of over- and under-
  
 40 Subnational governments are not all leaders. As I have discussed in my previous work, 
some of them push against larger-scale efforts to address climate change. See Osofsky, Is 
Climate Change “International”?, supra note 1; Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism, supra note 
1. However, at this stage in the climate change negotiations, the leader cities, states, and 
provinces are the primary ones meeting and forming agreements to try to supplement interna-
tional negotiations and there are no signs of subnational governments that oppose more strin-
gent regulation organizing in a similar fashion at an international level.  A more comprehen-
sive exploration of including subnational entities in international negotiations more directly 
would need to engage this divide in more depth and how that divide would be expressed in a 
representative inclusion of subnational voices. 
 41 See Local Government Climate Roadmap, From Copenhagen to Cancún to South Afri-
ca: COP15 – COP16 – COP17, ICLEI (July 2010), http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/template/ 
project_templates/climate-roadmap/files/Communication_Material/Towards_COP16/Conc 
ept_towards_COP16_Final_8September2010.pdf; Durban must Urbanize Climate Agenda, 
ICLEI (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/initi 
atives/LG_roadmap___COP_17_files/LGMA_Durban_DailyBriefing_DurbanOutcomes_LG
s-Subnationals.pdf. 
 42 See UNFCCC, supra note 5. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Erin Ryan has explored these interesting meta-questions of “who should decide” in her 
recent federalism work. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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representation?45 To what extent does this valuation of these smaller scale 
voices hinge on the presumption that they are pro-regulatory and how 
should our model address the possibility that fair representation likely 
would include anti-regulatory voices as well?46 Who would be bound, for-
mally or informally, and through what mechanisms? In a process centered 
around the governmental entities at different levels that are the focus of this 
piece, would nation-states and subnational governments have the same sta-
tus? Should we consider such a multi-government agreement to be interna-
tional law because of the agreements among nation-states or not to be inter-
national law because of its inclusion of non-nation-state actors or partially 
to be international law and partially not because of its hybrid status?47  
These pluralist and new governance approaches also would be more 
open to according some sort of international legal status to the subnational 
agreements that took place at the recent COPs. Like with the example of the 
negotiations, that acknowledgment of legal status might not take the form of 
adding to what would count as formal international law. Rather, these ap-
proaches could also have value in their treatment of both the formal and 
informal as part of the overall process of international lawmaking. Such 
treatment would address the problem raised in Part I of the formal negotia-
tions among nation-states having minimal space for meaningful acknowl-
edgement or incorporation of subnational agreements. 
This acknowledgement is a different and complementary solution to 
changing the negotiations themselves, and may be easier to achieve than an 
inclusive process under the treaty system itself. Treating transnational 
agreements among subnational governmental entities as a more meaningful 
part of the creation of the international law of climate change—even if that 
part is not a formal one—opens up space for the mutual pressure on both 
nation-states and subnational entities described above. The subnational 
agreements, if considered in the national negotiations more directly, might 
both place more pressure on the nation-states and reinforce to them the 
plausibility of further commitments. In turn, the national agreements, if ex-
plicitly relying upon those subnational agreements, might make them more 
binding upon those subnational entities as a matter of domestic, national 
law. 
As in the context of changing the treaty-negotiating process, such 
an approach to the subnational agreements raises questions that lack 
straightforward solutions. What does it mean to take those agreements more 
  
 45 Assuming there is a fair approach to representation, the democratic deficit problem 
should not be more severe than in a nation-state context since the subnational governments, 
like national ones, are sovereign representatives of the people (though like at a national level, 
democratic deficit may be a problem due to not very democratic forms of government). 
 46 See sources cited supra note 40. 
 47 For an exploration of some of these issues, see Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38. 
File: Osofsky 2 Created on: 2/10/2012 5:23:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:31:00 PM 
2011] POSSIBILITIES FOR GEOGRAPHIC CHANGE 433 
seriously as a practical matter? How would this approach differ from allow-
ing side programs to take place at the time of the main meeting? To what 
extent do the extensive informal ties between subnational and national gov-
ernments already accomplish this dynamic and, if this dynamic already ex-
ists, why is it not creating more forward motion in the negotiations? Is there 
any way to make transnational agreements among subnational entities bind-
ing at an international level, or would doing so simply require too much 
reconceptualization of international law? What exactly, as a legal matter, is 
being created through these processes if they are not treated as formal inter-
national law? As with the context of reconfiguring treaty negotiations, ad-
dressing these and other practical questions are critical for developing 
meaningful alternative approaches. 
Although pluralist and new governance approaches require creative 
reconceptualization and careful crafting, such an effort is worthwhile. The 
current reliance on traditional Westphalian notions of international law is 
not solving the problem of climate change quickly enough. Perhaps alterna-
tive approaches would not either. But given the urgency of the problem, 
some conceptual blockbusting is needed. In the context of these crises of 
international law, openness to more inclusive approaches puts more possi-
bilities on the table. These possibilities may not solve the problem of cli-
mate change, but they increase the hope of doing so. 
 
